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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
This appeal arises out of a class action filed on behalf of 
investors in Cendant Corporation ("Cendant") after Cendant 
disclosed prior "accounting irregularities" on April 15, 1998.1 
Several actions were filed as a result of this disclosure, 
including an action commenced on June 15, 1998 on 
behalf of purchasers of Cendant's Feline PRIDES shares. 
The PRIDES litigation was subsequently consolidated with 
the other pending Cendant actions. However, on August 4, 
1998, the District Court ruled that separate lead plaintiffs 
and lead counsel were to represent the interests of the 
PRIDES shareholders, as distinct from the rest of the 
Cendant class. (JA1300-01.) 
 
The firm of Kirby, McInerney & Squir e, formerly 
Kaufman, Malchman, Kirby & Squire, ("Kirby") was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Although there are other defendants, we refer to all the defendants as 
Cendant. 
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appointed as lead counsel of the Cendant PRIDES class. On 
November 12, 1998, Kirby filed a motion for class 
certification, for summary judgment on the claims under 
S 11 of the Securities Act, and for injunctive relief. On 
behalf of the PRIDES class, Kirby entered into a proposed 
settlement agreement with Cendant on Mar ch 17, 1999-- 
three and a half months after Kirby's motions were filed 
and no more than nine months after the action had been 
started. 
 
Under the settlement agreement, Cendant agr eed to issue 
Rights to new PRIDES, with a stated value of $11.71. 
(JA576-79.) Those rights were in trade for existing PRIDES. 
The total possible number and amount of Rights to be 
distributed pursuant to the agreement was 29,161,474, 
with an approximate stated value of $341,500,000. (JA590.) 
Regarding Kirby's attorneys' fees, the settlement agreement 
provided: "Cendant . . . will take no position on an 
application by Lead Counsel for an award of fees and 
expenses provided that such application shall not request 
fees in excess of 10% percent [sic] of the aggregate Stated 
Value of 29,161,474 Rights, which is appr oximately 
$341,500,000, plus reasonable expenses incurr ed by Lead 
Counsel in connection with this Action." (JA590.) 
 
The Notice of Pendency of Class Action summarized the 
proposed settlement of the PRIDES litigation. (JA239-52.) 
In connection with "Lead Counsel's fees and expenses," the 
Notice stated: "Lead Counsel has notified the other 
signatories hereto that it intends to apply to the Court for 
an award of fees, in an amount not to exceed 10% of the 
aggregate Stated Value of 29,161,474 Rights, or 
approximately $34.1 million, plus reasonable expenses." 
(JA247.) The Notice went on to explain how the attor neys' 
fees would be paid, first out of "Unclaimed Rights,"2 then 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. "Unclaimed Rights" are defined in the Stipulation and Agreement of 
Compromise and Settlement as "Rights as to which a timely and valid 
Proof of Claim has not been filed by a Holder ." (JA576.) All Unclaimed 
Rights "shall be cancelled and Cendant shall not issue, sell, or 
distribute 
any further Rights to any other person." (Notice of Proposed Settlement, 
JA248.) In addition, the Settlement provided that, though "Merrill Lynch 
beneficially owned 738,526 PRIDES as of the close of business on April 
15, 1998, Merrill Lynch nevertheless is not a class member and cannot 
recover new PRIDES in connection with the Settlement." (JA577.) 
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out of "Opt Out Rights," then out of the rights of class 
members with claims.3 
 
The Notice also asserted: 
         You also should know that the lead counsel 
         appointment process included a court-mandated 
         bidding process. This was intend to assur e that the 
         largest possible portion of any recovery remained with 
         participating class members, or conversely that 
         qualified lead counsel took the least possible sums 
         from the benefits to be obtained by participating class 
         members. In Lead Counsel's view, under the fee 
         mechanism proposed by Lead Counsel and described 
         herein, there is a substantial likelihood that a 
         substantial part, if not all, of the fees sought will be 
         obtained from Unclaimed Rights and Opt Out Rights. 
         As a consequence, in Lead Counsel's view, those Class 
         Members who become Authorized Claimants will not 
         have to pay any of Lead Counsel's fees, or if they do, 
         there is a substantial likelihood that it will be less than 
         the amount otherwise payable under the bids appr oved 
         by the Court in the process of appointing lead counsel. 
 
(JA247.) 
 
On May 4, 1999, the Joanne A. Aboff Trust ("Trust") filed 
several objections to the notice of settlement, all of which 
pertained to Kirby's representation and fee request,4 as well 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The settlement consisted of 29,161,474 Rights. After subtracting the 
attorneys' fees and expenses for Lead Counsel, 27,308,617 Rights 
remained. Proofs of Claim were filed with respect to 26,606,422 Rights, 
of which 22,502,782 Rights were validated by the claims administrator 
as of August 18, 1999. (Kirby Aff., Ex. L, atP 2.) Pursuant to the 
settlement agreement, the unclaimed Rights that were not used to pay 
Kirby for its fees and expenses were to be canceled by Cendant. Because 
the total amount of Rights requested in the Pr oofs of Claim (26,606,422 
Rights) was less than the amount of the settlement, after subtracting the 
amount to be given to Kirby (1,650,680 Rights, valued at $19,329,463), 
no claiming class members have had or will have their recovery reduced 
by the fees and expenses taken by Kirby. 
 
4. The Trust's objections concerned: 1) a "confidential Supplemental 
Agreement" between lead plaintiff and Cendant which was included in 
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as a notice of its intention to appear at the settlement 
hearing. (JA38-78.) At the settlement hearing on May 18, 
1999, lead counsel stated that "[t]her e is no objection to the 
settlement," (JA736), and the Trust's attor neys objected 
only to selection of class counsel and Kirby's r equest for 
attorneys' fees. 
 
On June 15, 1999, the District Court signed an Opinion 
and Order approving the settlement, stating: "The Court 
considers the settlement to be eminently fair and 
reasonable. The class is made completely whole by such 
compensation. There are no objections voiced to the 
settlement--only to the request for attor ney fees. The 
proposed settlement is approved subject to the following 
modifications to the attorneys' fees." In re Cendant Corp. 
PRIDES Litig., 51 F.Supp.2d 537, 541 (D.N.J. 1999). 
 
The District Court granted Kirby's request for expenses, 
finding that the requested expenses of $2,367,493 were 
"reasonable and necessary to the prosecution of this 
litigation." 51 F.Supp.2d at 542. Then the Court found that, 
for attorneys' fees, Kirby should receive a number of Rights 
equivalent to 5.7% of the balance of Rights r eceived by the 
Class. That percentage amounts to 1,650,680 Rights, 
valued at approximately $19,329,463. The District Court 
directed "Lead Counsel to seek to satisfy payment of these 
awards of expenses and fees from any unclaimed Rights. 
Then, and only then, to the extent that such fees and 
expenses have not been satisfied by unclaimed Rights, shall 
any deficiency be assessed against and bor ne by the class." 
51 F.Supp.2d at 542. The Court went on to instruct that 
"[a]ny rights unclaimed after authorized class claimants 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the Settlement but not published and apparently contained information 
about Cendant's and Lead Plaintiff 's obligations under the Settlement; 
and 2) "lead counsel's excessive fee request." (JA39-40.) The Trust 
argued, inter alia, that "[t]he combination of this unusual confidential 
agreement with Lead Counsel's excessive fee r equest . . . multiplies the 
potential that the class and the public will suspect that the settlement 
contains a collusive or improper provision by which Lead Plaintiff, Lead 
Counsel, and/or Cendant will benefit at the expense of the class." 
(JA46.) The text of this "Supplemental Agr eement" does not appear in the 
record, nor can we tell if it was discussed in the Notice. 
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and Lead Counsel have been issued their entitled Rights 
shall be canceled by Cendant Corporation." 51 F .Supp.2d 
at 542. 
 
On June 15, 1999, the District Court entered an Order 
and Judgment5 certifying the PRIDES class for settlement, 
approving the settlement "and the distribution of Rights 
and New PRIDES to Authorized Claimants set forth 
therein," dismissing with prejudice all settled claims, and 
awarding Lead Counsel 1,650,680 Rights as r easonable 
attorneys' fees and 202,177 Rights as r eimbursement of 
Lead Counsel's reasonable expenses. (JA728-30.) On the 
same date and as part of its opinion, the District Court 
denied the Trust's application for attor neys' fees. On July 
22, 1999, the Trust timely appealed the District Court's 
June 15 Orders and Judgment. 
 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to the 
final order doctrine of 28 U.S.C. S 1291, and we review the 
District Court's award of attorneys' fees for an abuse of 
discretion, "which can occur `if the judge fails to apply the 
proper legal standard or to follow pr oper procedures in 
making the determination, or bases an awar d upon findings 
of fact that are clearly erroneous.' " Zolfo, Cooper & Co. v. 
Sunbeam-Oster Co., 50 F.3d 253, 257 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(quoting Electro-Wire Prods., Inc. v. Sirote & Permutt, P.C. (In 
re Prince), 40 F.3d 356, 359 (11th Cir. 1994)). 
 
On August 27, 1999, Kirby filed a Motion in this court to 
dismiss the Trust's appeal for lack of standing, as well as 
presenting the standing issue in its appellate brief. 
 
I. 
 
Before we consider the merits of the Trust's appeal, a 
threshold question must be answered: does the Trust have 
standing to challenge the District Court's awar d of 
attorneys' fees to Kirby? See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 
Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998) (stating that "[t]he 
requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The District Court judge signed both the Opinion and the Order and 
Judgment on June 15, 1999, but the Opinion was filed on June 16, 
1999 and the Order and Judgment was filed on June 24, 1999. 
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matter `spring[s] from the natur e and limits of the judicial 
power of the United States' and `is inflexible and without 
exception' "). Because "the core component of standing is an 
essential and unchanging part of the case-or -controversy 
requirement of Article III," Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992), we may not hear this appeal if 
the Trust does not have standing. 
 
"Ordinarily, only a party aggrieved by a judgment or 
order of a district court may exercise the statutory right to 
appeal therefrom. A party who receives all that he has 
sought generally is not aggrieved by the judgment af fording 
the relief and cannot appeal from it." Deposit Guar. Nat'l 
Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 (1980) (emphasis added). 
In Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., the Third 
Circuit explicated the application of this principle to class 
actions, holding: "aggrieved class members may appeal any 
final order of a district court in pr oceedings held pursuant 
to Rule 23. This general proposition holds true even though 
such class members have the right to exclude themselves 
from the class." 453 F.2d 30, 32 (3d Cir. 1971) (emphasis 
added). 
 
The standing question in this case is troublesome, 
because it appears as if the PRIDES settlement has 
provided the class members with full recovery and because 
any reduction in the amount of attorneys' fees to Kirby will 
not be distributed among the class members, but instead 
those rights will be returned to and canceled by Cendant. 
Therefore, Kirby argues, the T rust is not aggrieved by the 
award of attorneys' fees and has no standing to appeal. 
 
While this argument admittedly has a superficial 
attraction because the PRIDES class members will 
seemingly recover a "dollar-for -dollar" return for their 
claims and Kirby's fees will not reduce their r ecovery, we 
nevertheless hold that the Trust does have standing to 
appeal the award of attorneys' fees. 6 We base this holding 
on two related concepts: 1) the nature of the relationship 
between class plaintiffs, class counsel, and defendants in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Our holding that the Trust has standing to appeal disposes of the 
motion made by Kirby on August 27, 1999 to dismiss the Trust's appeal. 
We will deny that motion. 
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class actions requires that the "aggrieved" requirement be 
construed broadly in class action cases; and 2) the 
judiciary's independent authority over the appointment of 
class counsel, the grant of attorneys' fees, and the review of 
attorneys' fee awards in class actions. In connection with 
these two principles, we require that district courts conduct 
an extensive analysis and inquiry before deter mining the 
amount of fees, because we have an independent inter est in 
monitoring district courts' fee awards, particularly those 
awards stemming from Rule 23 class actions. See, e.g., 
Zucker v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 192 F.3d 1323, 1328 
(9th Cir. 1999); see generally Advisory Committee's Notes 
on Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, 28 U.S.C., Notes following Rule 23 
(addressing, inter alia, "the question of the measures that 
might be taken during the course of the action to assure 
procedural fairness"). Indeed, we ar e in effect third parties 
to the fee award process, albeit silent parties for the most 
part until the award is finalized and r eviewed. 
 
A. 
 
Ostensibly, lead class counsel represents all class 
plaintiffs. However, in attempting to settle a large class 
action, class counsel must often spend more time 
negotiating with and interacting with the defendants than 
with their own clients. This situation presents several 
dangers. First, as we observed in Prandini v. National Tea 
Co., "a defendant is interested only in disposing of the total 
claims asserted against it[, and] the allocation between the 
class payment and the attorneys' fees is of little or no 
interest to the defense." 557 F.2d 1015, 1020 (3d Cir. 
1977). Moreover, the "divergence in [class members' and 
class counsel's] financial incentives . . . cr eates the `danger 
. . . that the lawyers might urge a class settlement at a low 
figure or on a less-than-optimal basis in exchange for red- 
carpet treatment for fees.' " In r e General Motors Corp. Pick- 
Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig. (hereinafter "In re GM 
Trucks"), 55 F.3d 768, 820 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting 
Weinberger v. Great Norther n Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 
524 (1st Cir. 1991). 
 
This unique relationship among plaintif fs' counsel, 
plaintiffs, and defendants in class actions imposes a special 
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responsibility upon appellate courts to hear challenges to 
fee awards by class members whose claims may have been 
reduced or in some way affected in exchange for large fee 
awards. See In re GM Trucks , 55 F.3d at 819-21. This is so 
even in this case, where the Trust pr esumably will not 
benefit from a reduction in Kirby's attorneys' fees, because 
the PRIDES settlement was structured so that any 
remaining Rights will be returned to Cendant. 
 
The Ninth Circuit addressed a similar situation in Zucker 
v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 192 F .3d 1323 (9th Cir. 
1999), pointing out in its discussion that, even where the 
plaintiff "gets the same money whether the fee is cut or not, 
. . . a client whose attorney accepts payment, without his 
consent, from the defendants he is suing, may have a 
remedy, and this remedy may extend to a plaintiff class 
whose class attorneys accept payment fr om the defendants 
the class is suing." 192 F.3d at 1326. 
 
The Ninth Circuit took this reasoning a step further in 
Lobatz v. U.S. West Cellular of Calif., in which the court, 
holding that a class member had standing to appeal an 
attorneys' fee award "even though that award was payable 
independent of the class settlement," stated: 
 
         If . . . class counsel agreed to accept excessive fees and 
         costs to the detriment of class plaintiffs, then class 
         counsel breached their fiduciary duty to the class[, 
         and] any excessive award could be consider ed property 
         of the class plaintiffs, and any injury they suffered 
         could be at least partially redressed by allocating to 
         them a portion of that award. 
 
Lobatz, 222 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir . 2000). 
 
Under the Ninth Circuit's analysis, ther efore, the Trust 
need not benefit from a reduction in Kirby's fee to have 
standing to appeal. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit suggested 
in Zucker that the requirement that class plaintiffs be 
aggrieved should be construed broadly, citing Judge 
Sneed's observation in his dissent in In r e First Capital 
Holdings "that `[a]rguably, a class member always retains 
an interest in attorney fees, even when her claims have 
been met in full.' " Zucker, 192 F .3d at 1328 (quoting In re 
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First Capital Holdings Corp. Fin. Prods. Sec. Litig., 33 F.3d 
29, 31 (9th Cir. 1994) (Sneed, J., dissenting). 
 
As a class member, the Trust was eligible to receive "one 
Right, a marketable security freely tradeable until February 
14, 2001, having the terms described her ein for each 
Income PRIDES and Growth PRIDES ($50.00 face amount) 
beneficially owned by Class members at the close of 
business on April 15, 1998 if such Class member submits 
a valid and timely proof of claim form." (JA239.) The Notice 
of the Proposed Settlement stated that "[e]ach Right will be 
designed to have a stated or theoretical value of $11.71," 
but acknowledged that "the Rights may trade in the market 
at a price below their theoretical value." (JA239.) Moreover, 
the Notice stated that "Cendant believes that r ecoverable 
damages (if any) per share could be lower or higher than 
the per PRIDES damages estimated by lead counsel for the 
Class." (JA239.)7 
 
Though Kirby asserts that each class member r eceived 
full recovery from this settlement, in which case, it is 
contended, the Trust would not be aggrieved by the fee 
award, the description of the settlement in the Notice and 
its ultimate implementation by class members is uncertain 
as to class members' actual recovery. Because class 
members received rights which must be traded on the 
market to be liquidated, a number of factors could 
contribute to class members not receiving the theoretical 
$11.71 per Right. It is noteworthy that the settlement 
provided class members with no immediate cash payment, 
but rather left class members in the position of r elying on 
the marketability of their new Rights for reimbursement of 
their claims. That reliance, apart from any other market 
risks, might itself be chancy in light of Cendant's history of 
"accounting irregularities" and in light of the recent market 
and economy slow down. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The settlement, as noted above, provides for Rights which are "freely 
tradeable until February 14, 2001," which date has passed. The record 
does not disclose whether all the claimed Rights have been traded or the 
actual value of those Rights. Hence, because the r ecord is silent and the 
settlement itself has not been challenged on this appeal, we do no more 
than call attention to that aspect of the settlement. 
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Nor does even a "dollar-for-dollar" recovery in cash 
undermine our power and jurisdiction and our special 
responsibility to review fee awards. Indeed, though the fact 
of market fluctuation and its effect on the value of class 
members' recovery influences our decision that the Trust 
has standing, we are equally convinced of our appellate 
jurisdiction over class settlements in which plaintiffs 
received a "dollar-for-dollar" recovery in cash. Indeed, it 
would be preposterous to hold that, even where a district 
court awarded a fee of 75% of the recovery to class counsel, 
we would have no power to review such an inappr opriate 
and outrageous award in the absence of an objector whose 
claims had been directly reduced as a r esult of the award. 
Our oversight and supervisory function would necessarily 
come into play to correct such a decree. This duty of review 
with which we are vested will be discussed in more detail 
in the next section. 
 
B. 
 
As indicated above, we are convinced of our obligation to 
vacate the District Court's order awarding fees by the 
special position of the courts in connection with class 
action settlements and attorneys' fee awar ds. As we 
observed in In re GM Trucks,"a thorough review of fee 
applications is required in all class action settlements." 55 
F.3d at 819. Specifically, the danger inher ent in the 
relationship among the class, class counsel, and 
defendants "generates an especially acute need for close 
judicial scrutiny of fee arrangements" in class action 
settlements.8 55 F.3d at 820. In discussing this duty of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We should make clear that we do not attribute any motives or designs 
to Kirby that would indicate any conflict by Kirby with its responsibility 
to the class, nor do we mean to intimate that Kirby acted improperly. 
Indeed, as the District Court found and we have no r eason to dispute, 
Kirby discharged its function as lead counsel in exemplary fashion. The 
cautions we express, which are present in the unique context of class 
actions and the fee awards which arise in this context, pertain solely to 
the issue of whether, where class members have apparently received 
dollar-for-dollar recovery, standing is available for an objector to a fee 
award. For all the reasons we express here, we are satisfied that it is. 
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district courts to oversee class settlements in In re GM 
Trucks, we explained: 
 
         the court's oversight task is considerably complicated 
         by the fact that these attorney-class conflicts are often 
         difficult to discern in the class action context, "where 
         full disclosure and consent are many times difficult 
         and frequently impractical to obtain." Finally, we 
         emphasize that the court's oversight function serves 
         not only to detect instances of "the actual abuse[that 
         potential attorney-class conflicts] may cause, but also 
         [the] potential public misunderstandings they may 
         cultivate in regard to the interests of class counsel." 
 
55 F.3d at 820 (quoting In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. 
Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 224, 225 (2d Cir . 1987)). In other 
words, we indicated in In re GM T rucks the importance of 
the judicial role in finalizing class action settlements, and 
we suggested that this importance derived fr om general 
concerns about "potential public misunderstandings" as 
much as from a desire to protect the plaintiffs in the 
particular class. 
 
In Zucker, in asserting that the district court was 
required to review the award of attorneys' fees regardless of 
whether anyone had standing to challenge the awar d, the 
Ninth Circuit stated: 
 
         In a class action, whether the attorneys' fees come 
         from a common fund or are otherwise paid, the district 
         court must exercise its inherent authority to assure 
         that the amount and mode of payment of attor neys' 
         fees are fair and proper. This duty of the court exists 
         independently of any objection. Therefor e it exists, a 
         fortiori, regardless of whether an objector has a 
         remediable economic stake in the court's decision. 
         Because the district court had the authority and duty 
         to pass upon the fairness of the attor neys' fees 
         settlement independently of whether there was 
         objection, we need not decide whether the objector had 
         standing. 
 
192 F.3d at 1328-29. 
 
The court in Zucker further explained that"[n]o Article III 
case or controversy is needed with regar d to attorneys' fees 
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as such, because they are but an ancillary matter over 
which the district court retains equitable jurisdiction." 192 
F.3d at 1329. The Ninth Circuit found support for this 
proposition in the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit that 
"because `the reasonableness of attor neys' fees is within the 
overall supervisory authority' of the court in a class action, 
the court did not need to reach the question of whether an 
objector has standing." Zucker, 192 F .3d at 1329 (quoting 
Grunin v. Int'l House of Pancakes, 513 F .2d 114, 127 n.13 
(8th Cir. 1975)). 
 
While the statements in In re GM T rucks and Zucker refer 
to the authority of district, not appellate, courts in 
connection with class action settlements, the cases make 
clear that reviewing courts retain an interest--a most 
special and predominant interest--in the fairness of class 
action settlements and attorneys' fee awar ds. Accordingly, 
our interest as a reviewing court in ensuring that district 
courts fulfill their obligations and comply with the 
instructions and guidelines in this area bolsters our 
determination that the Trust has standing to challenge 
Kirby's fee award. 
 
Nor is our responsibility in connection with class action 
matters restricted to reviewing the final fee determination 
made by the District Court. Our interest and supervisory 
role is pervasive and extends not only to thefinal fee award 
but also to the manner by which class counsel is selected 
and the manner by which attorneys' fee conditions are 
established. 
 
Here, the District Court employed a sealed-bid auction to 
select class counsel. That process, which occurred virtually 
at the inception of the instant class action, is itself fee- 
driven. As such, it invites, indeed requir es, judicial 
examination and, hence, our jurisdiction. This is so both 
because of the unique relationship between class members, 
class counsel, and the defendants in class actions and 
because of our strong interest in the fair ness of class 
settlements and the cost of achieving such settlements. 
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., National Law Journal, Sept. 
14, 1998, at B6 (discussing selection of lead counsel 
through auctions and "bidding rules"). 
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Because it is the district court's function to participate in 
the litigation process in this way, as the District Court did 
here, and because, as noted, our judicial scrutiny reaches 
to all corners of the class action process including the 
selection of class counsel--a selection which impacts on the 
final fee award and fairness of the settlement--we would be 
remiss if we failed to exercise our jurisdiction in this area. 
 
An analogy, albeit one that is far afield fr om class action 
fees, is helpful to illustrate and emphasize the court's 
interest and the role that our inter est plays in our decision 
to hear this appeal. In Powers v. Ohio, a post-Batson case,9 
the Supreme Court held that a white criminal defendant 
had standing to object to and appeal the exclusion of black 
jurors through peremptory challenges, even though the 
defendant and the potential jurors were of different races. 
499 U.S. 400 (1991). In its discussion of standing, the 
Court stated: 
 
         The discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by the 
         prosecution causes a criminal defendant cognizable 
         injury, and the defendant has a concrete inter est in 
         challenging the practice. This is not because the 
         individual jurors dismissed by the prosecution may 
         have been predisposed to favor the defendant; if that 
         were true, the jurors might have been excused for 
         cause. Rather, it is because racial discrimination in the 
         selection of jurors "casts doubt on the integrity of the 
         judicial process," and places the fair ness of a criminal 
         proceeding in doubt. 
 
Powers, 499 U.S. at 411 (internal citations omitted). 
 
Likewise, just as discriminatory selection of jur ors "casts 
doubt on the integrity of the judicial process" such that the 
defendant in Powers had standing to appeal, the integrity 
and fairness of class settlements is thr eatened by excessive 
attorneys' fee awards such that class plaintiffs have 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Supreme Court "held 
that a [black] defendant can raise an equal pr otection challenge to the 
use of peremptories at his own trial by showing that the prosecutor used 
them for the purpose of excluding members of the defendant's race." 
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. at 405 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96). 
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standing to challenge excessive fee awards, even when they 
have received dollar-for-dollar r ecovery in the class 
settlement. 
 
Because of the possible injury to the Trust as well as 
other class members from the fee award in this case and, 
more importantly, because of our overar ching interest in 
class fee awards, we therefore hold that the Trust has 
standing to appeal the fee award. Accor dingly, we now turn 
to the fee award that the District Court granted to Kirby 
and review that award for an abuse of discretion. See In re 
GM Trucks, 55 F.3d 768, 782 (3d Cir . 1995). 
 
II. 
 
There are two primary methods for calculating attorneys' 
fees: the percentage-of-recovery method 10 and the lodestar 
method.11 "The per centage-of-recovery method is generally 
favored in cases involving a common fund,12 and is 
designed to allow courts to award fees fr om the fund `in a 
manner that rewards counsel for success and penalizes it 
for failure.' " In re Prudential, 148 F.3d at 333. "The lodestar 
method is more commonly applied in statutory fee-shifting 
cases, and is designed to reward counsel for undertaking 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. This method has been described as follows:"The percentage of 
recovery method resembles a contingent fee in that it awards counsel a 
variable percentage of the amount recover ed for the class." In re GM 
Trucks, 55 F.3d 768, 819 n.38 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
11. The lodestar method was initially set forth in Lindy Bros. Builder, 
Inc. 
of Philadelphia v. American Radiator & Standar d Sanitary Corp., 487 
F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973), appeal following remand, 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 
1976). As this court explained in Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., "[a] 
court determines an attorney's lodestar by multiplying the number of 
hours he or she reasonably worked on a client's case by a reasonable 
hourly billing rate for such services given the geographical area, the 
nature of the services provided, and the experience of the lawyer." 223 
F.3d 190, 195 n.1 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
12. "[T]he common-fund doctrine . . . allows a person who maintains a 
lawsuit that results in the creation, pr eservation, or increase of a fund 
in which others have a common interest, to be r eimbursed from that 
fund for litigation expenses incurred." Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 
Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, 108 F.R.D. 237, 241 (1985) 
(hereinafter "Task Force Report"). 
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socially beneficial litigation in cases wher e the expected 
relief has a small enough monetary value that a 
percentage-of-recovery method would pr ovide inadequate 
compensation." 148 F.3d at 333. 
 
The total settlement in this case was valued at 
$341,500,000, and the District Court granted attor neys' 
fees in the amount of $19,329,463.13 As the District Court 
noted, this amount constitutes 5.7% of the class's total 
recovery. In connection with the lodestar calculation, the 
District Court observed that "Lead Counsel, thr ough its 
principal partners, associates, and paralegals expended 
approximately 5,600 hours, and its senior partners have a 
regular hourly rate of $495." 51 F.Supp.2d at 542. Using 
the $495 hourly rate, the lodestar multiplier14 for the 
District Court's fee award is 7.15  
 
Two primary principles govern our review of the District 
Court's fee award to Kirby: 1) did the District Court provide 
sufficient explanation for granting the fee awar d of $19.3 
million?; and 2) was the award so unreasonably high that 
the District Court abused its discretion in granting that 
amount in attorneys' fees? 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Kirby's ceiling for fees, as explained in the Notice of Settlement, 
was 
ten percent of the total settlement. The settlement was calculated at 
$341.5 million, ten percent of which would be $34,150,000. That figure 
was reduced by the District Court to $19,329,463. 
 
14. The Task Force Report explained that, after the lodestar is 
calculated, "[t]he `lodestar' then could be increased or decreased based 
upon the contingent nature or risk in the particular case involved and 
the quality of the attorney's work. An incr ease or decrease of the 
lodestar 
amount is referred to as a `multiplier.' " Task Force Report, 108 F.R.D. 
237, 243. 
 
15. 5,600 hours x $495 = 2,772,000. $19,329,463 divided by 2,772,000 
= 6.97. This multiplier of 7 essentially comports with the information 
provided by Kirby after oral argument. In that letter, Kirby stated that 
"the blended hourly compensation to ourselves and those law firms who 
were working with us was approximately $3,300." (Dec. 19, 2000 Kirby 
Letter, at 2.) $3,300 divided by $495 = 6.67, only slightly less than the 
6.97 multiplier calculated from the figur es provided by the District 
Court. 
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A. 
 
In Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., we considered a 
district court's award of attorneys' fees in a class action 
settlement. 223 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2000). That case involved 
a $9.5 million settlement, out of which the district court 
allowed attorneys' fees amounting to 18% of the settlement 
fund, significantly less than the one-thir d requested by the 
attorneys. 223 F.3d at 191. The district court in Gunter 
explained its decision as follows: "The natur e of this 
litigation, its resolution at this stage without the necessity 
of trial, the nature of the settlement, and its value, convince 
the court that it would place a reasonable bur den on the 
class to award attorneys' fees of 18% of the Settlement 
Fund, or $1,700,000." 223 F.3d at 192 (citing Gunter v. 
Ridgewood Energy Corp., Civ. No. 95-438 (WHW), at 3 
(D.N.J. Nov. 16, 1999)). The attorneys appealed the district 
court's reduction of their fee request. 
 
In reviewing the district court's fee awar d in Gunter, we 
stated that "[w]e give [a] great deal of deference to a district 
court's decision to set fees." 223 F.3d at 195. However, we 
noted, "[n]otwithstanding our deferential standard of 
review, it is incumbent upon a district court to make its 
reasoning and application of the fee-awar ds jurisprudence 
clear, so that we, as a reviewing court, have a sufficient 
basis to review for abuse of discretion." 223 F.3d at 196. 
Therefore, "if the district court's fee-award opinion is so 
terse, vague, or conclusory that we have no basis to review 
it, we must vacate the fee-award order and remand for 
further proceedings." 223 F.3d at 196. In addition, "if a 
district court does not fulfill its duty to apply the relevant 
legal precepts to a fee application, it abuses its discretion 
by not exercising it." 223 F.3d at 196. 
 
In Gunter, we vacated the district court's fee award 
because the district court "dealt with the fee-award issue in 
a cursory and conclusory fashion" and did not employ the 
factors which this Court has stated that district courts 
should consider in awarding fees using the per centage-of- 
recovery method in common-fund class actions. See Gunter, 
223 F.3d at 196-97. These factors wer e set forth in Gunter 
in a footnote: 
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         Among other things, these factors include: (1) the size 
         of the fund created and the number of persons 
         benefitted; (2) the presence or absence of substantial 
         objections by members of the class to the settlement 
         terms and/or fees requested by counsel; (3) the skill 
         and efficiency of the attorneys involved; (4) the 
         complexity and duration of the litigation; (5) the risk of 
         nonpayment; (6) the amount of time devoted to the 
         case by plaintiffs' counsel; and (7) the awar ds in 
         similar cases. 
 
Gunter, 223 F.3d at 195 n.1 (citing In re Prudential, 148 
F.3d 283, 336-40 (3d Cir. 1998); In re GM Trucks, 55 F.3d 
768, 819-22 (3d Cir. 1995)). 
 
As in Gunter, the District Court's fee opinion in this case 
was too cursory for us to "have a sufficient basis to review 
for abuse of discretion." Gunter, 223 F.3d at 196. The 
District Court did not even specify whether it was using the 
percentage-of-recovery method or the lodestar method to 
set attorneys' fees. Nor, if the District Court intended to 
utilize the lodestar method, did it calculate the lodestar 
multiplier. Rather, the District Court, in a conclusory 
paragraph bereft of analysis, stated: 
 
         This Court has examined the time expended by Lead 
         Counsel and the regular hourly rates of its services. 
         Lead Counsel, through its principal partners, 
         associates, and paralegals expended approximately 
         5,600 hours, and its senior partners have a r egular 
         hourly rate of $495. This represents significant effort. 
         But the Court is more impressed by the quality of 
         result than the quantity of effort. The class will receive 
         its full entitlement. And resolution of this matter was 
         greatly accelerated by the creative dynamism of 
         counsel. For this, counsel should not be penalized by 
         a slavish application of the lodestar. W e have seen the 
         gifted execution of responsibilities by a lead counsel. 
 
51 F.Supp.2d at 542. Despite the District Court's obvious 
dissatisfaction with the lodestar method, the court did not 
even address the percentage-of-recovery method, except to 
the extent that it calculated that the fee awar d constituted 
5.7% of the total class recovery. 
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The percentage-of-recovery method has long been used in 
this Circuit in common-fund cases. Indeed, in the 1985 
Third Circuit Task Force r eport entitled Court Awarded 
Attorney Fees, the Task Force discussed the problems with 
the lodestar method in detail. "Accordingly, the Task Force 
recommend[ed] that in the traditional common-fund 
situation . . . , the district court . . . should attempt to 
establish a percentage fee arrangement." Task Force Report, 
108 F.R.D. 237, 255 (1985). Since that time, we have 
several times reaffirmed that application of a percentage-of- 
recovery method is appropriate in common-fund cases. See, 
e.g., Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp. , 223 F.3d 190, 195 
n.1 (3d Cir. 2000); Brytus v. Spang & Co. , 203 F.3d 238, 
243 (3d Cir. 2000); In re Prudential, 148 F.3d 283, 333-34 
(3d Cir. 1998); In re GM Trucks, 55 F.3d 768, 821 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
 
Though this is not a traditional common-fund case, 
because the unclaimed portion of the settlement fund is 
returned to Cendant and because the plaintiffs who recover 
may not be affected by the attorneys' fee award (depending 
on the number of plaintiffs who recover rights from the 
fund), use of the percentage-of-recovery method is 
appropriate in this case. Since the District Court 
highlighted the inadequacy of the lodestar method, it can 
be assumed that that court also perceived that the 
percentage method was a better method of calculating 
attorneys' fees in this case. This is consistent with the 
District Court's opinion awarding attor neys' fees in the 
larger and separate Cendant settlement, in which it did 
declare, "[f]ollowing established Thir d Circuit law . . . , the 
Court will award fees by a percentage-of-r ecovery method." 
In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 109 F .Supp.2d 285, 298 (D.N.J. 
2000).16 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. By referring to the District Court's method of calculating attorneys' 
fees in the separate Cendant case (see  text at p. 2, supra, where we 
noted that the PRIDES shareholders were to be represented separately 
from the primary Cendant class), we by no means indicate that the fees 
awarded to the primary Cendant class wer e a proper exercise of the 
District Court's discretion. We leave that determination to the panel of 
this court assigned to review that fee awar d. 
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As discussed above, we have articulated at least seven 
factors to be considered by district courts in setting 
percentage fee awards in common fund cases. See Gunter, 
223 F.3d 190, 195 n.1 (3d Cir. 2000). The District Court, 
however, did not explicitly consider any of these factors.17 In 
addition to rejecting the lodestar method, the District Court 
stated: "The Court appreciates Lead Counsel's verve and 
the eminently satisfactory results it obtained for the class. 
There are no objections to the settlement agreement." 51 
F.Supp.2d at 541. In addition, the District Court mentioned 
the initial sealed bidding process and r eferred to the 
resulting bid to which Kirby agreed "as a benchmark of 
reasonableness." 51 F.Supp.2d at 542 (quoting In re 
Cendant Corp., 182 F.R.D. 144, 152 (D.N.J. 1998). 
However, when it came to setting the fee awar d, the District 
Court said simply, "[t]he Court deter mines that counsel fees 
of 5.7% of this net balance [of the total awar d less Lead 
Counsel's expenses of $2,367,493] are r easonable." 51 
F.Supp.2d at 542. 
 
It could be argued that, in the few terse statements 
quoted above, the District Court took into account three of 
the seven Gunter factors: "the pr esence or absence of 
substantial objections by members of the class to the 
settlement terms and/or fees requested by counsel"; "the 
skill and efficiency of the attorneys involved"; and "the 
amount of time devoted to the case by plaintif fs' counsel." 
Gunter, 223 F.3d at 195 n.1. However , the District Court 
brushed over our required analysis of those factors in 
setting the attorneys' fees. 
 
Significantly, the District Court did not consider at all the 
other factors which we deem to be more important in this 
case, namely "the complexity and duration of the litigation" 
and "the [range of] awards in similar cases." 223 F.3d at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. We recognize that our decision in Gunter was issued after the District 
Court ruled on the settlement and fee application in this case and that, 
therefore, the District Court could not have been informed in its decision 
by our holding in Gunter. However, all of the principles enunciated in 
Gunter have been announced by this court befor e, in cases predating the 
District Court's decision on appeal here. See, e.g., In re Prudential, 148 
F.3d 283, 336-40 (3d Cir. 1998); In re GM Trucks, 55 F.3d 768, 819-22 
(3d Cir. 1995) 
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195 n.1 (emphasis added). Nor does it appear that the 
District Court "cross-check[ed] the percentage award . . . 
against the `lodestar' award method," which is "suggested" 
practice for district courts setting fee awar ds by the 
percentage-of-recovery method. Gunter , 223 F.3d at 195 
n.1. Further, the District Court did not"make its reasoning 
and application of the fee-awards jurisprudence clear." 
Gunter, 223 F.3d at 196.18 
 
B. 
 
Because the District Court failed to consider the Gunter 
factors that we deem essential to a proper exer cise of 
discretion and to an appropriate consideration of attorneys' 
fee awards, we will discuss those factors her e. 
 
1. Complexity and Duration of Litigation 
 
In April 1998, Cendant announced past accounting 
irregularities and stated that its financial statements for 
certain past years would be restated. 51 F .Supp.2d at 539. 
On behalf of the Cendant PRIDES class, Kirby filed an 
Amended and Consolidated Class Action Complaint on 
November 11, 1998, accompanied by a motion for class 
certification, a motion for summary judgment, and a motion 
for preliminary injunctive relief. Less than two months 
later, on January 7, 1999, the parties announced that they 
had reached "an agreement in principal[sic]," and the 
parties presented a proposed settlement agreement to the 
District Court on March 17, 1999. 51 F.Supp.2d at 540. 
 
As the District Court observed, "[t]his stage of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. The District Court did indicate in its opinion that it was using the 
bid to which Kirby had agreed "as a benchmark of reasonableness" in 
setting the fee. 51 F.Supp.2d at 541. However , a preliminary bidding 
process cannot replace subsequent analysis of the factors listed in 
Gunter. The circumstances and progression of every case are different, 
and these unique factors must be taken into account by district courts 
awarding attorneys' fees. Therefor e, though the result of a bidding 
process may be of use to a district court in awarding fees at the end of 
the case, it cannot supplant post-settlement analysis to determine a 
reasonable fee. 
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litigation, notwithstanding that Lead Counsel has moved for 
summary judgment, is what would be normally the 
discovery period, very early on in the litigation." 51 
F.Supp.2d at 541. The District Court also noted that Kirby 
spent approximately 5,600 hours on this action. 
 
In setting Kirby's fee award, the District Court apparently 
turned a blind eye to the following factors: 1) the case was 
relatively simple in terms of proof, in that Cendant had 
conceded liability and no risks pertaining to liability or 
collection were pertinent; 2) the case was settled at a very 
early stage of the litigation, with an agreement being 
announced two months after Kirby filed for class 
certification and a proposed settlement being submitted to 
the District Court two months after that; 3) ther e was a 
minimal amount of motion practice in this case--before 
settlement, Kirby submitted only the Complaint and three 
motions, all on the same day; 4) discovery was virtually 
nonexistent--indeed the District Court did not mention any 
depositions taken or document review conducted by Kirby; 
and 5) Kirby spent a relatively small amount of time on this 
case compared to the amount of time expended in most 
other large class actions. 
 
2. Range of Awards 
 
Before reviewing specific awards in other large class 
settlements, we will review generally the range of attorneys' 
fee awards in common fund settlements of class actions. In 
In re GM Trucks, we observed that "[o]ne court has noted 
that the fee awards have ranged from nineteen percent to 
forty-five percent of the settlement fund." 55 F.3d 768, 822 
(3d Cir. 1995) (citing In re Smithkline Beckman Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 751 F. Supp. 525, 533 (E.D. Pa. 1990)). We also 
noted in In re Prudential that "[t]he district court . . . 
examined the fee awards in class actions with r ecoveries 
exceeding $100 million and found the fee per centages 
ranged from 4.1% to 17.92%." 148 F.3d 283, 339 (3d Cir. 
1998). 
 
However, recently two district courts in this Circuit have 
declined to follow this court's statement of the range in In 
re Prudential, stating that "the cases cited in [In re 
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Prudential] were all decided at least thirteen years ago." In 
re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. Sec. Litig. , 194 F.R.D. 166, 196 
(E.D. Pa. 2000); In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prod. Liab. 
Litig., 2000 WL 1622741, at 7 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2000). 
Indeed, in another Cendant opinion dealing with attorneys' 
fees, this same District Court stated that, in cases surveyed 
by lead counsel, "[a]wards . . . ranged from a low of 20% in 
the case with a $200 million recovery to a high of 33.3% for 
cases with recoveries of $77.5 million and $110 million." In 
re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 109 F .Supp.2d 285, 290 
(D.N.J. 2000). These varying ranges of attor neys' fees 
confirm that a district court may not r ely on a formulaic 
application of the appropriate range in awar ding fees but 
must consider the relevant circumstances of the particular 
case. 
 
One important consideration is the size of the settlement. 
The Task Force Report stated, with r eference to fee awards 
in common fund cases: "The negotiated fee, and the 
procedure for arriving at it, should be left to the court's 
discretion. In most instances, it will involve a sliding scale 
dependent upon the ultimate recovery, the expectation 
being that, absent unusual circumstances, the percentage 
will decrease as the size of the fund incr eases." 108 F.R.D. 
237, 256 (1985). We called attention to this statement in In 
re Prudential, explaining that "[t]he basis for this inverse 
relationship is the belief that `[i]n many instances the 
increase [in recovery] is mer ely a factor of the size of the 
class and has no direct relationship to the efforts of 
counsel.' " In re Prudential, 148 F.3d at 339 (quoting In re 
First Fidelity Bancorporation Sec. Litig., 750 F . Supp. 160, 
164 n. 1 (D.N.J. 1990)). Accordingly, district courts setting 
attorneys' fees in cases involving lar ge settlements must 
avoid basing their awards on percentages derived from 
cases where the settlement amounts were much smaller. 
 
3. Other Awards 
 
The District Court did not undertake to review the fees 
granted in other class action settlement cases, particularly 
in other large settlement cases, i.e., cases in which the 
common fund exceeded $100 million.19 Had it conducted 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. A district court in this Circuit noted that "[c]ourts have generally 
decreased the percentage awarded as the amount recovered increases, 
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such a review, the District Court should have looked 
specifically at cases in which the percentage-of-recovery 
method, not the lodestar method, was employed to set the 
fee award, and it should have examined the r easoning 
behind the district courts' fee awards in cases of similar 
size. 
 
Below, we have set forth a chart of fee awar ds given in 
federal courts since 198520 in class actions in which the 
settlement fund exceeded $100 million21  and in which the 
percentage of recovery method was used. 22 We have 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
and $100 million seems to be the informal marker of a `very large' 
settlement." In re Orthopedic Bone Scr ew Prod. Liab. Litig., 2000 WL 
1622741, at 7 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2000). 
 
20. In 1984, the Supreme Court observed in Blum v. Stenson that "[in] 
the calculation of attorney's fees under the`common fund doctrine,' . . . 
a reasonable fee is based on a percentage of the fund bestowed on the 
class." 465 U.S. 886, 900 n.16 (1984). Subsequently, the Third Circuit 
Task Force Report in 1985 outlined the pr oblems with the lodestar 
method and recommended that courts use the per centage-of-recovery 
method instead of the lodestar method in common fund cases. After this 
instruction from the Supreme Court and the release of the Task Force 
Report, courts across the country regularly employed the percentage 
method to set fees in common fund cases. 
 
21. Although we have emphasized the seven-factor analysis required in 
class action fee cases set forth in Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 
F.3d 190, 195 n.1 (3d Cir. 2000), Gunter is not listed in this chart 
because the settlement in that case was less than $100 million. 
 
22. In several cases, the class settlement exceeded $100 million but the 
lodestar method was used to determine attor neys' fees. See, e.g., 
McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 872 F. Supp. 142 (D.N.J. 1994) 
(settlement was for more than $400 million, and lodestar multiplier of 
1.5 was used to award attorneys' fees); In re Shell Oil Refinery Litig., 
155 
F.R.D. 552 (E.D. La. 1993) ($170 million settlement and $31.8 million in 
fees, which represented a 3.25 lodestar multiplier and approximately 
18% of the total settlement); In re W ashington Public Power Supply Sys. 
Sec. Litig., 779 F. Supp. 1056 (D. Ariz. 1991) ($687 million settlement, 
$32 million in attorneys' fees, 1.2 lodestar multiplier, and attorneys' 
fees 
were 4.7% of total settlement); In r e Baldwin-United Corp. Litig., 1986 
WL 
12195 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 1986) ($183.8 million settlement, $7.5 million 
in attorneys' fees, lodestar multiplier of 2, and fees were 4.1% of total 
settlement); In re "Agent Orange" Pr 
                    od. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1296 
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outlined the amount of settlement, the percentage of the 
settlement that made up the attorneys' fee award and the 
lodestar multiplier. 
 
Case                                    Settlement       Fees as %          
Lodestar 
                                                         of Recovery        
Multiplier 
 
In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig.,      $341.5 million   5.7%               
7-10 
51 F. Supp. 2d 537 (D.N.J. 1999)                         ($19.3 mil.) 
The instant case under review here. 
 
In re Cendant Corp. Litig.,             $3.16 billion    8.275%             
32.7 
109 F.Supp.2d 285 (D.N.J. 2000)                          ($262 mil.) 
 
In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., $512 million      5.2%               
Inf. not 
2001 WL 170792 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22,                        ($27 mil.)         
available 
2001) 
 
In re Orthopedic Bone Screw             $100 million     12%                
Inf. not 
Prod. Liab. Litig., 2000 WL 1622741                                         
available 
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2000) 
 
In re Prudential,                       $1.8 billion     5%                 
2.13 
106 F.Supp.2d 721 (D.N.J. 2000)23                        ($90 mil.) 
 
In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. Sec. $111 million      30%                
2.7 
Litig., 194 F.R.D. 166 (E.D. Pa. 2000)  
 
Shaw v. Toshiba America Inf. Sys.,      $2.1 billion     7%                 
Inf. not 
Inc., 91 F.Supp.2d 942 (E.D. Tex. 2000)                  ($147 mil.)        
available 
 
In re Sumitomo Copper Litig.,           $116 million     27.5%              
2.5 
74 F.Supp.2d 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)                         ($32 mil.) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
(E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff 'd in part 818 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1987) ($180 million 
settlement, $10.7 million in attorneys' fees, lodestar multiplier of 1.25 
to 
1.75, and fees were 6% of settlement). 
 Additionally, it should be noted that the chart includes a substantial 
number of the post-1985 cases involving large settlements and fees 
granted as a percentage of the total settlement, but the chart is not 
comprehensive. We feel that the selection of cases in the chart are 
representative of the range of cases r elevant to the District Court's 
analysis of Kirby's fee application in this case. 
 
23. The district court originally awarded attorneys' fees in this case in 
1997, see In re Prudential, 962 F . Supp. 572 (D.N.J. 1997), which 
decision was vacated and remanded by the Thir d Circuit. See In re 
Prudential, 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir . 1998). Those decisions are discussed 
infra. 
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Case                                      Settlement        Fees as %       
Lodestar 
                                                            of Recovery     
Multiplier 
 
Kurzweil v. Philip Morris Co., 1999 WL   $123.8 million     30%             
2.46 
1076105 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1999)                            ($37.1 mil.) 
 
In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig.,        $190 million       25%             
1.35 
186 F.R.D. 403 (S.D. Tex. 1999) 
 
In re Copley Pharm., Inc.,               $150 million       13%             
2 
1 F.Supp.2d 1407 (D. Wyo. 1998)                             ($19.5 mil.) 
 
In re PaineWebber Ltd. P'ships Litig. ,  $200 million       13%             
1.4 
999 F. Supp. 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)                            ($25.9 mil.) 
 
Walco Investments, Inc. v. Thenen,       $141 million       15%             
1.8 
975 F. Supp. 1468 (S.D. Fla. 1997)                          ($21 mil.) 
 
In re Combustion Inc.,                   $127 million       36%             
2.99 
968 F. Supp. 1116 (W.D. La. 1997)  
 
Local 56, United Food & Commercial       $114.5 million     2.8%            
2.39 
Workers Union v. Campbell Soup Co.,                         ($3 mil.) 
954 F. Supp. 1000 (D.N.J. 1997)  
 
Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 922 F. Supp.    $102.5 million     10%             
Inf. not 
1261 (S.D. Ohio 1996), aff 'd                               ($10.2 mil.)    
available 
102 F.3d 777 (6th Cir. 1996)  
 
In re Domestic Air Transportation        $305 million       5.25%           
Inf. not 
Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297                            ($14.3 mil.)    
available 
(N.D. Ga. 1993)  
 
In re MGM Grand Hotel Fire Litig.,       $205 million       7%              
1-2.95 
660 F. Supp. 522 (D. Nev. 1987)  
 
In the charted cases, the attorneys' fee awards ranged 
from 2.8% to 36% of the total settlement fund. Looking at 
the percentage of recovery in this case (5.7%), it appears 
that it is in line with the other cases and even at the low 
end of the range. However, a brief review of the facts and 
posture of these other cases makes clear that, when 
examined through the seven-factor lens of Gunter, the 
higher fees awarded in the other cases wer e far more 
justified than the high award in this case. Accordingly, the 
District Court should have learned from those cases that 
extensive time and effort exerted by the attorneys and the 
existence of complex legal and factual issues warranted 
higher fee awards than the fee award that would have been 
appropriate for Kirby. 
 
The district court in In re Auction Houses relied on a pre- 
settlement bidding process in awarding attorneys' fees. The 
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bidding process in that case differed from the process 
employed by the District Court in this case, but it raised 
similar problems. However, regar dless of the arguable flaws 
in the method by which the district court awarded fees in 
In re Auction Houses, that case was far more complex than 
the instant case and, as such, is distinguishable. Indeed, 
the comments of interim lead counsel, excerpted in the 
district court's opinion, are telling: 
 
         Mr. Furth, on behalf of all of the interim lead counsel, 
         said that he "never in [his] fondest dreams . . . believed 
         that these defendants would pay $512 million" and 
         that this settlement "is the most outstanding r esult I 
         have ever heard of in the history of the antitrust laws." 
         Another of the interim lead counsel noted that he and 
         his colleagues had been negotiating with defendants 
         prior to the appointment of plaintiffs' lead counsel, that 
         they "had really good hard solid numbers from 
         [defendants], and we didn't think we could have 
         accomplished what Mr. Boies did." 
 
In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 2001 WL 170792, at 6 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2001). 
 
In In re Orthopedic Bone Screw, the district court 
described the case as "nothing less than an uninterrupted, 
hard-fought, `antagonistic' legal battle," in which the 
attorneys seeking fees had "conducted substantial, 
widespread and extensive discovery" including reviewing 
more than 1,500,000 pages of documents, and had 
"defended a variety of pleadings and discovery matters and 
`litigated a plethora of motions,' " which resulted in the 
court issuing nearly 2,000 Pretrial Orders. 2000 WL 
1622741, at 6. 
 
In In re Ikon Office Solutions, the district court granted 
the 30% fee request because, inter alia, "Counsel expended 
more than 45,000 hours on this case and paid out 
expenses of more than $3 million with no guarantee of 
recovery," the case presented "the legal obstacles of 
establishing scienter, damages, causation, and the like," 
and "derivative counsel fees will be taken fr om this 
amount." 194 F.R.D. at 194. 
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In Shaw v. Toshiba, the district court noted the 
protracted schedule of the case, because of which "it has 
been necessary to prosecute this action continuously, 
around the clock, seven days a week, workdays and 
holidays alike." 91 F.Supp.2d at 969. Other factors that 
made litigation of Shaw difficult included the two million 
pages of documents reviewed by class counsel, the fact that 
defendant's corporate headquarters were located in Tokyo, 
Japan, as well as the additional burden of having to 
translate many documents and much of the testimony from 
Japanese to English. Even with these numerous procedural 
difficulties, the district court only awarded 7% of the 
settlement in attorneys' fees. 
 
The attorneys in Sumitomo spent mor e than 43,000 
hours on the case and inspected 11 million pages of 
documents, and the case had legal and factual complexities 
including "the existence and analysis of the relationships 
between and among more than thirty Comex futures 
contracts, more than 500 LME contracts, literally hundreds 
of physical contracts, and millions of tons involved in the 
copper futures, the copper options and the copper 
derivative contracts." Sumitomo, 74 F .Supp.2d at 398. 
 
In Kurzweil, the district court noted that, before the 
settlement, "[t]here had been no lar ge settlements in 
tobacco litigation generally, and no successful action had 
yet been brought against a tobacco company based on 
allegations of addictiveness of nicotine." 1999 WL 1076105, 
at 1. In addition, the attorneys encountered several 
obstacles, including that the action was originally 
dismissed, and the attorneys reviewed millions of 
documents and tens of thousands of deposition and trial 
transcripts and conducted numerous depositions. 1999 WL 
1076105, at 1. 
 
In In re Lease Oil, the district court explained: 
 
         As well as being novel, this litigation was highly 
         complex and thus required a great deal of lawyering 
         skill. As just explained, the task of simply compiling 
         the evidence was an unusually difficult task, r equiring 
         the assistance of experts and the investment of many 
         hours.24 Also, being novel, the legal issues raised in the 
         litigation required skilled attorneys to handle them. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
24. With respect to gathering evidence, the court asserted: 
 
         Godfrey and others had to create their own databases, compiling 
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186 F.R.D. at 445. 
 
The district court in Copley, in granting the 13% fee 
award, observed that, "[d]uring expedited discovery, class 
counsel reviewed and analyzed more than 125,000 pages of 
documents and deposed roughly one hundr ed witnesses." 1 
F.Supp.2d at 1408. The case also included 42 days of trial, 
and class counsel spent 48,794 hours on the case. Finally, 
the legal questions involved in Copley wer e both novel and 
complex. As the court explained: "not only was the 
certification of this class a complex question, but this was 
also the first and only mass tort class action to go to trial, 
and the case presented complex medical and scientific 
issues of causation." 1 F.Supp.2d at 1413. 
 
PaineWebber too had many featur es that would dictate a 
high fee award. Class counsel conducted "extensive, 
coordinated discovery," including "coor dinating discovery of 
hundreds of boxes of documents through the use of 
sophisticated computer databases, and deposing many key 
witnesses." 999 F. Supp. at 722. In mor e than two years of 
litigation, counsel spent "approximately 70,000 hours in 
heretofore uncompensated legal work in pursuit of factual 
investigation, drafting of documents, brief writing, 
document analysis, depositions, trial preparation, 
settlement negotiation and other tasks." 999 F . Supp. at 
723. Finally, the legal issues in PaineW ebber were complex, 
and class counsel "faced significant substantive and 
procedural defenses." 999 F. Supp. at 724. 
 
Walco Investments was described by the district court as 
comprising "four years of bitterly-contested litigation." 975 
F. Supp. at 1470. The case involved multiple defendants, 
and the claims were only loosely related, making class 
litigation exceedingly complicated, because "claims raised 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
         posted prices, NYMEX prices, transportation costs, grade and 
weight 
         differentials and so forth simply to determine whether or not a 
         cause of action might exist. And, in order tofirst articulate 
their 
         claims, class counsel had to hire experts to r esearch their 
allegation 
         that the NYMEX trading center method is a reasonable way of 
         determining market price at the lease. 
 
In re Lease Oil, 186 F.R.D. at 445. 
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against each category of defendants presented separate 
issues of fact and law and involved differing theories of 
recovery." 975 F. Supp. at 1471. These circumstances 
encouraged the court to award 15% in attor neys' fees to 
attorneys from fourteen differ ent firms representing class 
plaintiffs. 
 
The action in In re Combustion was eleven years old at 
the time of settlement and the attorneys had spent over 
50,000 hours on the case. In the litigation, ther e had been 
"roughly 160 complaints filed, 1140 answers, 1922 
motions, with almost 1000 memoranda in support of or in 
opposition to these motions, 285 depositions . . . , 90 
hearings, at least one oral argument per month since the 
case was removed to federal court, and endless numbers of 
settlement conferences," as well as "thr ee fairness hearings, 
the first one lasting one week, and the other two lasting 
approximately one day each" and "one Daubert hearing 
lasting a total of two weeks." In re Combustion, 968 F. 
Supp. at 1136. 
 
In Local 56, the court acknowledged "the complexity of 
the issues in this case, the significant attendant risks of 
proceeding with litigation, and the tenacity and vigor with 
which all counsel represented their clients' interests," in 
this class action which lasted for four years. 954 F . Supp. 
at 1005. Even so, class counsel's fees amounted to only 
2.8% of the total settlement, a far smaller per centage than 
the fee awarded to Kirby by the District Court. 
 
In Bowling, the district court averr ed that "[t]he Court's 
choice of a percentage . . . will be heavily informed by the 
value of the services rendered by Counsel." 922 F. Supp. at 
1280. The court observed that "Counsel wer e confronted 
with myriad complex legal and factual questions in bringing 
this action and in negotiating the settlement." 922 F. Supp. 
at 1280. 
 
Domestic Air involved a class action against several 
airline companies claiming a conspiracy to fix prices. The 
court observed: 
 
         Counsel negotiated a significant settlement for the 
         class in light of the precarious financial position of 
         most of the defendants and over defendants' insistence 
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         that they could not provide a larger cash settlement. 
         Were it not for the considerable skill and effort of 
         plaintiffs' counsel, the action would never have been 
         certified as a class action and members of the class 
         would receive nothing in return for their claims against 
         defendants. 
 
148 F.R.D. 297, 351-52 (N.D. Ga. 1993). In other words, 
the action in Domestic Air involved fundamental procedural 
obstacles that could easily have resulted in no recovery at 
all. Accordingly, class counsel was rewar ded significantly 
for negotiating such a large settlement. 
 
Finally, in In re MGM Grand Hotel, the court considered 
"the particular and unique circumstances of this case," 
including the fact that the attorneys had r ecovered over 
6,000 objects from the fire site and had conducted over 
1,400 depositions, in granting the 7% fee awar d. 660 F. 
Supp. at 526. 
 
Indeed, in case after case, the same factors r ecur: 
complex and/or novel legal issues, extensive discovery, 
acrimonious litigation, and tens of thousands of hours 
spent on the case by class counsel. Because none of these 
factors which increase the complexity of class litigation was 
present here, it makes sense that the fee awarded in this 
case should be far lower than those awarded in the charted 
cases, which fees ranged from 2.8% to 36% of the total 
settlement. 
 
Also relevant to the District Court's analysis in this case 
is our holding in In re Prudential r emanding the case to the 
district court. In that case, we rejected an award of 6.7% of 
the settlement fund in a case with a fund of $1 billion to $2 
billion because the district court had failed to explain 
adequately why it had applied such a high per centage to 
the settlement figure and because the court had not 
explained why the 5.1 lodestar multiplier was justified. We 
also warned in In re Prudential against overemphasizing 
counsel's role in recovery, in the context of our criticism of 
the district court's assumption that counsel had been a 
catalyst for a plan authored by the Multi-State Life 
Insurance Task Force, which facilitated the class action 
settlement in that it established Prudential's liability. We 
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explained that "[a]llowing private counsel to receive fees 
based on the benefits created by public agencies would 
undermine the equitable principles which underlie the 
concept of the common fund, and would create an incentive 
for plaintiffs attorneys to `minimize the costs of failure . . . 
by free riding on the monitoring efforts of others.' " In re 
Prudential, 148 F.3d at 337. Similarly, as we have 
consistently observed, Cendant's liability and consequent 
collectability had been conceded at the outset of the 
PRIDES controversy, and that fact should have been given 
major consideration by the District Court when setting 
Kirby's attorneys' fees. 
 
Our review of the lack of complexity of this case and of 
awards in other large class action settlements, all of which 
involved more complex issues, more time invested by the 
attorneys, and, with only a few exceptions, smaller total 
settlements, leads us to the conclusion that the District 
Court abused its discretion in granting a 5.7% attorneys' 
fee award in this case.25 
 
4. Checking Against Lodestar 
 
The District Court's abuse of discretion in this case is 
magnified when one looks at the lodestar multiplier. As we 
stated above, "we have . . . suggested that district courts 
cross-check the percentage award at which they arrive 
against the `lodestar' award method." Gunter v. Ridgewood 
Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 195 n.1 (3d Cir. 2000); see 
also In re Prudential, 148 F.3d at 333 (stating that " `it is 
sensible for a court to use a second method of fee approval 
to cross check' its initial fee calculation"). Even when the 
lodestar method is used only as a cross-check,"courts 
must take care to explain how the application of a 
multiplier is justified by the facts of a particular case."26 In 
re Prudential, 148 F.3d at 340-41. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
25. We should note that the award actually amounted to more than 5.7% 
of the total recovery. The fund had a value of $341.5 million, but any 
unclaimed portion of the fund returned to Cendant. As of August 1999, 
only 22,502,782 Rights, with a monetary value of $263.5 million, were 
claimed. Taking this amount as the total r ecovery, Kirby's attorneys' 
fees 
constituted 7.3% of the total fund. 
26. We observed in In re GM Trucks that "[t]he Supreme Court . . . has 
rejected the use of multipliers to enhance the lodestar's hourly rate 
 
                                32 
  
In this case, the lodestar multiplier is 7 at a minimum 
(using Kirby's senior partner rate as the rate for all hours), 
and the Trust calculates the lodestar multiplier as 10.27 
Either of these multipliers (Kirby's multiplier of 7 or the 
Trust's multiplier of 10) is substantially higher than any of 
the multipliers in the cases charted above, which range 
from 1.35 to 2.99, and is also significantly higher than the 
"large" 5.1 multiplier in In r e Prudential, which we 
questioned because "the court offer[ed] little explanation as 
to why a multiplier was necessary or appropriate." 148 F.3d 
at 340-41. In allowing such a high multiplier in this case 
without even calculating it, much less explaining how it is 
justified, the District Court strayed from all responsible 
discretionary parameters in the awarding of Kirby's 
attorneys' fees. 
 
In all the cases in which high percentages wer e applied 
to arrive at attorneys' fees, the courts explained the 
extensive amount of work that the attorneys had put into 
the case, and appropriately the lodestar multiplier in those 
cases never exceeded 2.99. This range is consistent with 
the principle that " `[m]ultiples ranging from one to four are 
frequently awarded in common fund cases when the 
lodestar method is applied.' " In r e Prudential, 148 F.3d 283, 
341 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting 3 Herbert Newber g & Alba 
Conte, Newberg on Class Actions, S 14.03 at 14-5 (3d ed. 
1992)). In this case, the District Court judge made clear 
that he wanted to reward Kirby for Kirby's quick and 
beneficial settlement of the case, and that may be a good 
reason for the fee award to exceed the lodestar, but not to 
the exclusion of all other factors. On remand of this case to 
the District Court, we strongly suggest that a lodestar 
multiplier of 3 (the highest multiplier of the cases reviewed 
above) is the appropriate ceiling for a fee award, although 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
amount." 55 F.3d 768, 822 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing City of Burlington v. 
Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992)). However, as stated above, calculation of 
the lodestar multiplier is still appropriate when used to cross-check the 
reasonableness of a percentage-of-r ecovery fee award. 
 
27. The Trust calculates the lodestar multiplier as 10 because it assesses 
the appropriate lodestar fee as $1.9 million, 1/10 of the $19.3 million 
awarded. (See Trust's Brief at 25-26.) 
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a lower multiplier may be applied in the District Court's 
discretion. The 3 multiplier would result in an award of no 
more than $8.3 million for Kirby (calculating the lodestar at 
$495/hour). 
 
5. 
 
We are seriously troubled by the District Court's award of 
attorneys' fees constituting 5.7% to 7.3% of the total 
settlement. As discussed above, this case was neither 
legally nor factually complex and did not require significant 
motion practice or discovery by Kirby, and the entir e 
duration of the case from the filing of the Amended 
Complaint to the submission of a Settlement Agr eement to 
the District Court was only four months. Other cases in 
which higher percentages were awar ded are so dissimilar 
factually and legally from this case that they cannot be 
relied upon to support the 5.7% award made in this case. 
In addition, our discussion and holding in In r e Prudential 
requires a holding here that the District Court's award was 
an abuse of its discretion, particularly wher e the District 
Court appeared to be attributing more r esponsibility to 
Kirby for the quality of the settlement than may legitimately 
be warranted. Accordingly, we will vacate the District 
Court's fee award to Kirby and remand the issue of Kirby's 
attorneys' fees to the District Court for a more thorough 
and thoughtful evaluation, including an analysis of, and 
compliance with, the factors enunciated by us in Gunter 
and in this opinion. 
 
III. 
 
Finally, the Trust argues that the District Court erred in 
not granting attorneys' fees to the Trust's attorneys for 
suggesting a bidding process to choose Lead Counsel and 
for objecting to Lead Counsel's fee application. 
 
The Second Circuit stated in White v. Auerbach: 
 
         it is well settled that objectors have a valuable and 
         important role to perform in pr eventing collusive or 
         otherwise unfavorable settlements, and that, as the 
         district court recognized, they are entitled to an 
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         allowance as compensation for attorneys' fees and 
         expenses where a proper showing has been made that 
         the settlement was improved as a result of their efforts. 
 
         Ordinarily the trial judge has broad discr etion in 
         deciding whether, and in what amount, attor neys' fees 
         should be awarded, since he is in the best position to 
         determine whether the participation of objectors 
         assisted the court and enhanced the recovery. 
 
500 F.2d 822, 828 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 
In this case, the District Court judge exercised his "broad 
discretion" in finding that the Trust's attorneys had not 
made the "proper showing . . . that the settlement was 
improved as a result of their efforts." The District Court 
judge made clear that he had considered the idea of a 
bidding process before the Trust's attorneys suggested that 
procedure, stating: "Walker's opinions have been out there 
since 1993 at least28 . . . Why do you think that the door 
was only opened by your key?" (JA 766.) He also asserted 
that "my last year's clerk and I actually had br ooded this 
idea of an auction long before you came down the pike." 
(JA767.) 
 
With respect to the Trust's claim that its attorneys' 
objections to the fee application resulted in a reduction of 
the fee award from $34.15 million to appr oximately $19 
million, the District Court gave no indication that the 
objections were the reason for the r eduction and even 
stated, "if I find that what Mr. Kirby wants is excessive, I'm 
not dependent upon you . . ." (JA765.) Hence, because the 
Trust had not demonstrated that it had been r esponsible 
for the procedure utilized by the District Court or that its 
actions had resulted in a reduction of Kirby's fees from $34 
million to $19 million--findings which are not clearly 
erroneous--we will sustain the District Court in its rulings 
on these points. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
28. Judge Vaughn Walker actually implemented the bidding process in In 
re Oracle Sec. Litig. in 1990. 131 F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Cal. 1990). Judge 
Walker's process differed significantly from the bidding process here in 
that it was not a sealed-bid process. 
 
                                35 
  
However, our review of the District Court's attorneys' fee 
award to Kirby would not have come about had it not been 
for the Trust's appeal. As the Ninth Cir cuit observed in 
Zucker v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., to which we have 
earlier adverted, "[t]he contribution [a particular class 
member's] attorney made, by providing an adversarial 
context in which the district court could evaluate the 
fairness of attorneys' fees, was substantial." 192 F.3d 1323, 
1329 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 
Recognizing this fact, that it was the Trust which called 
our attention to the many aspects of Kirby's fee award 
which we have discussed and which we have found 
requires reconsideration by the District Court, we would be 
remiss if we did not acknowledge this benefit 29 and remand 
the Trust's claims for its own attorneys' fees to the District 
Court for reconsideration together with Kirby's fee 
application. Of course, this will requir e the necessary 
submissions by the Trust's attorneys to comply with 
normal fee procedures. Under these circumstances, we 
think it appropriate for the District Court to evaluate the 
value of the benefit of the Trust's contribution to the 
ultimate fee (to be decided by the District Court on remand) 
and to compensate the Trust to that extent. 30 
 
In so holding, we are fully aware that Cendant had 
agreed not to contest the award of fees as part of its 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
29. It bears mention that the Trust's appellate brief urged that Kirby's 
fees be reduced from $19 million to $7.6 million, (see Appellant's Brief, 
at 30), a similar figure to the one at which we arrived independently. 
 
30. In its appellate brief, Kirby suggests that the Trust may not have 
standing to appeal the District Court's denial of the fee request because 
it was the Trust's counsel, not the Trust itself, that made that request 
in the District Court. This jurisdictional ar gument, though not without 
merit, need not concern us for two reasons. First, the District Court's 
decision denying fees to the Trust's counsel stands insofar as it related 
to the argument raised by counsel befor e the District Court. We remand 
the issue of the Trust's counsel's fee r equest to the District Court only 
with respect to the Trust's effect on the settlement through this appeal. 
Second, we have repeatedly emphasized in this opinion the importance 
of the court's role in reviewing counsel's fees in class actions, and we 
believe this role extends to the District Court hearing a fee application 
by 
the Trust's counsel at this point. 
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settlement agreement. We also acknowledge that the return 
to Cendant of any unclaimed rights may well enhance the 
value of Cendant's rights to its shareholders and rights 
beneficiaries. 
 
IV. 
 
Although we will not disturb the settlement itself which 
has not been challenged on appeal, we will vacate the 
award of attorneys' fees to Kirby and r emand this case to 
the District Court for a reevaluation of the amount of 
attorneys' fees, both because the District Court did not 
adequately explain its reason for the fee awar d and because 
the fee award does not comply with the r equirements of our 
jurisprudence. We will also vacate the District Court's order 
denying attorneys' fees to the Trust and remand for 
reconsideration in light of the foregoing discussion and 
opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
         Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
         for the Third Circuit 
 
                                37 
 
